

## friendship

provide the essential validating decree. For some Imami jurists, this meant that Friday prayer had lapsed during the period of the imam's concealment (*ghayba*), and holding Friday prayer was, therefore, forbidden until he revealed himself. The debate around the legitimacy of Friday prayer in later Imami jurisprudence became intricate and politically charged, particularly when the presence of a "just jurist" (*faqih 'adil*) was introduced by some jurists as a legitimating element. During the Safavid period, some jurists argued that Friday prayer could become "optionally" obligatory (*wājib takhyīrī*, i.e., one can perform it or one can perform the usual noon prayers instead, but one must perform one of the two) through the activating presence of the just jurist, who could substitute for the imam. The Safavid state officially supported this view, appointing an *imām-i jum'a* to each city as the Friday prayer leader. The move was controversial and provoked a series of rebuttals and counter-rebuttals in a debate that continued into the 21st century.

The importance of the Friday prayer event as a political tool within Muslim societies is obvious. Through the *khuṭba*, the objectives of the government's religious policy can be made known, as they have been in modern-day Saudi Arabia. The *khuṭba* can also function as a conduit for revolutionary propaganda as it did in the months leading up to the Islamic Revolution in 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini's Friday sermons from Najaf in Iraq, and then later from Paris, were smuggled into Iran on cassette tapes. The holding of a communal congregational prayer has, unavoidably, proven to be of great political possibilities, both in terms of its formal requirements and in its potential as a vehicle for social mobilization.

See also Pillars of Islam

### Further Reading

Norman Calder, "Friday Prayer and the Juristic Theory of Government: Sarakhsī, Shīrāzī, Māwardī," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 49, no. 1 (1986); Andrew J. Newman, "Fayd al-Kashani and the Rejection of the Clergy/State Alliance: Friday Prayer as Politics in the Safavid Period," in *The Most Learned of the Shi'a, The Institution of the Marja' Taqlid*, edited by Linda Walbridge, 2001; Haggay Ram, *Myth and Mobilization in Revolutionary Iran: The Use of the Friday Congregational Sermon*, 1994.

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## friendship

Friendship is an informal, voluntarily entered, and noncontingent social relationship. It is distinguished from kinship and servitude in that it is acquired by choice, not ascribed or inherited. According to the Qur'an, friendship—overwhelmingly but not exclusively rendered by words deriving from the root *w-l-y*—is to be sought

with God, prophets, and other believers, in that order. Those who reject God—for example, Satan and his supporters, and unbelievers who actively oppose the believers—are not to be befriended. God is, because of the succor He provides, the best and most trustworthy friend. Cognizant of this, when Abraham experiences adversity, he rejects Gabriel's assistance in the expectation of God's help, which is in fact provided; this earns Abraham the title *khalīl Allāh*, "the bosom-friend" of God. As might be expected, only the elect attain this level of friendship. The very pious and the saintly do, however, benefit from a special relationship with God and are consequently called *awliyā' Allāh*, or "friends of God." The close relationships—ranging from discipleship to veneration—developed with such saintly figures, notably Sufi shaykhs, have been criticized by many reformist groups (e.g., the Salafi movement).

Friendship with the Prophet Muhammad is described by the term *ṣuḥba*, or companionship; thus both intimate friends of Muhammad, such as Abu Bakr, and those who had limited contact with him, are called *ṣaḥāba*, or "Companions," perhaps because this relationship implies discipleship. Later, in the scholarly context, a disciple, or an advanced student, would, along the same lines, come to be known as a *ṣāhib* (literally, companion).

Companionship was the dominant form of friendship enjoined in manuals of guidance and counsel for rulers, so-called Mirrors for Princes, and was actively pursued by Muslim leaders. From Umayyad times, caliphs and rulers sought courtiers and boon companions (*nadīm*), some becoming favorites or lifelong friends. One courtier, Abu Hayyan al-Tawhīdī (d. 1023), after decades of mixed fortunes at court, wrote a treatise on the subject, titled *Kitāb al-Sadaqa wa-l-Sadiq* (On friendship and friends). The *Kitāb Fadl al-Kilab 'ala Kathir min man Labisa al-Thiyab* (The superiority of dogs over many who wear clothes) of Ibn al-Marzuban (tenth century) also treats friendship, but, as the title suggests, using humor and satire.

By virtue of the inevitable asymmetry, friendship with God, the Prophet, saintly figures, caliphs, and other high officials, even teachers, resembles patronage; indeed, the term frequently used to describe God, Muhammad, a religious leader, or a ruler, is *mawlā* (Lord, master, protector). Additionally, *mawlā* is the term used to describe non-Arabs who were affiliated to Arabs. This clientage (*walāya*) was an important feature of early Islam, socially and politically.

*Walāya* is also the term used to describe political alliance; its antithesis, *barā'a*, means dissociation or disavowal. These are both variously discussed in historical, religiopolitical and juridical Sunni texts, even latter-day tracts produced by the likes of Mulla 'Umar, the spiritual leader of the Taliban and, from 1996 to 2001, de facto head of state in Afghanistan. For Shi'is, these concepts appear as two of their fundamental principles of belief, *tawallā* and *tabarrū'* (also *tabarrī* and Persian *tabarrā*). These doctrines developed in connection with early theological discussions about dissociation (*barā'a*) from the first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and 'Umar b. al-Khattab, regarded as usurpers of 'Ali b. Abi Talib's rightful succession to Muhammad, and about the consequently implied allegiance

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(*walāya*) to 'Ali. Paradoxically, it appears to have been the Kharijis who first developed theories of dissociation in connection with their unhappiness with this same 'Ali. Dissociation (*barā'a*) formed the basis for the elaboration of theories of excommunication, either of the historical individuals to be denigrated or of contemporaries to be shunned.

Muslims are bound together as friends by the ultimate communal norm—namely, the adherence to Islam. This makes the Muslims an *umma*, or a community, one that transcends tribal or kinship relations, though Muhammad also frequently described Muslims as brothers (*ikhwa*), suggesting that kinship, even metaphorically, remains the most potent and valorized social relation. Clientage, by obligating shared sympathies and antipathies, in many respects resembled (and was meant to resemble) kinship, and even Muhammad cemented his ties to his closest Companions through marriage (and the ensuing kinship).

See also abodes of Islam, war, and truce; Pillars of Islam

### Further Reading

Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought*, 2001; Patricia Crone, *Medieval Islamic Political Thought*, 2005; Ibn al-Marzuban, *The Book of Superiority of Dogs over Many of Those Who Wear Clothes*, translated and edited by G. R. Smith and M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, 1978; Tawhidi, *De l'amitié*, translated by Eveyne Lar-guèche and Françoise Neyrod, 2006.

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## fundamentalism

Fundamentalism refers to contemporary religiopolitical movements that aim to establish the primacy of scriptural authority as a defense against the moral, political, and social decay that supposedly defines the modern world. It is also often used in everyday language to designate inflexible and dogmatic beliefs of any kind, religious or otherwise. Such common connotations tend to obscure the specific cultural and historical circumstances that produced both the term and the movement it originally described. The term "fundamentalism" was coined in 1920 by Protestant Evangelicals eager to rescue American Christianity and culture from what they characterized as the degeneration inaugurated by "modernism in theology," "rationalism in philosophy," and "materialism in life." Committed to "do battle royal for the Fundamentals," such warriors for God launched an offensive against liberalism, Darwinism, and secularism in particular, declaring the Bible the authoritative moral compass for American life, infallible not only in regard to theological issues but also in regard to matters of historical, geographical, and scientific fact.

The broadened understanding of fundamentalism presumes that there is sufficient commonality and overlap among Christian,

Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and other kinds of religious revivalism to warrant a single rubric despite significant cultural, historical, and linguistic differences. There are some good reasons for this assumption. In general, these are historically contemporaneous, distinctively religious movements that assert the authority of transcendent truths and timeless traditions in response to a perceived crisis precipitated by rapid cultural, social, and economic transformations. As urbanization, industrialization, and the crises they are said to engender are distinctive to the contemporary epoch, fundamentalism has, as Bruce Lawrence writes in *Defenders of God*, "historical antecedents, but no ideological precursors." Fundamentalists may well see themselves as custodians of continuity, yet it is precisely this self-description that distinguishes them from believers for whom tradition was simply lived rather than justified. Tradition becomes a conscious commitment in need of systematic justification when longtime rituals, beliefs, and practices can no longer be taken for granted. Paradoxically, then, defenders of tradition are actually reconstructing it in response to challenge and change.

### Fundamentalism and Modernity

This means that efforts to restore the primacy of supposedly timeless truths and traditions inadvertently reveal how thoroughly intertwined contemporary religiopolitical movements are with the conditions, ideas, and processes fundamentalists oppose. This is evident in fundamentalist depictions of modernity as a condition of decay or disease evinced by pervasive corruption, disorder, relativism, and immorality. Fundamentalists contend that such ills are the wages of human hubris, by-products of the misguided assumption that the ever-enlarging scope of human mastery evinced by rapid scientific and technological advances demonstrates the irrelevance of metaphysical sources of knowledge about the world. Such an assumption transfigures sins into natural urges, recasts selfishness as the wellspring of collective life, and reduces the divine plan for the universe and all things in it to a system of physical causality just waiting to be mastered by human ingenuity. Stripped of the moral compass only faith in God provides and bereft of the religious scaffolding that endows life with meaning and purpose, humans are portrayed as lurching toward an abyss we no longer have the ability to recognize, let alone navigate. At this critical juncture, we are told, only the righteous attuned to God's will are capable of charting the path to redemption. Like the prophesies of Cassandra, however, their warnings and guidance are largely destined to fall upon deaf ears.

To the degree that this perspective characterizes a wide range of contemporary religiopolitical movements, fundamentalists can be said to share an ambivalence toward modernity and the rationalist epistemology, or human-centered theory of knowledge, that in part constitutes it. Scholars have interpreted this ambivalence in quite different ways, however. Some portray fundamentalism as the last gasp of atavistic impulses and archaic commitments, the residue of premodern beliefs and practices rendered obsolete by scientific advances, technological innovations, and the globalization of